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ABSTRACT 
 
There have been serious trade disputes between the U.S. and Japan since the mid-1970s. The source 
of trade dispute is that the U.S. has had large trade deficits which have been caused mostly by large 
American imports from Japan, especially in the early 1980s when the dollar was appreciating. Since 
the 1980s, many disputes have arisen due at least in part, to U.S. allegations that Japanese markets 
are closed to imports because of restrictive practices such as exclusive dealings between domestic 
manufacturers and distributors. It is further alleged that the practices are tolerated and even 
encouraged by the Japanese government. It has long been said that the U.S. and Japan should 
manage their trade friction wisely, so not to embitter the overall relationship between the two 
countries. This is based upon recognition of the importance of the Japan-U.S. relationships on the 
one hand, and of the possibility of serious trade friction on the other. This precept is effective 
because there always remain countries that may not be able to handle it to mutual satisfaction. This 
paper will analyze trade disputes, tensions, and related issues between the two economic powers to 
reduce trade conflicts and to improve overall trade relations. Another purpose is to suggest common 
grounds to minimize trade conflicts between two countries. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 trade war begins when one country to hurt another country with the help of trade policy measures. 
The beginning of any trade war is the initiation of an offensive by one nation, A, by means of illicit 
trade policy measures for the purposes of putting pressure on another on another country, B. This is 
the first strike stage of an unfolding trade war. Further developments depend on the reaction of the target hit by this 
first strike. Nation B in theory has several options, e.g. ignore, comply, retaliate, accept mediation or bargain. These 
responses correspond to a number of scenarios for the further evolution of a potential trade after the first stage; 
abortive trade war, blitzkrieg, rule-based dispute settlement, multilateralism of rule-making and escalation. Until the 
1970s, trade disputes between Japan and the U.S. were mostly related to the surging exports of Japanese products to 
the U.S. In the 1980s, however, the two countries began to have more disputes over the alleged difficulties 
foreign producers face when to enter Japanese markets. Many of those disputes were based on U.S. allegations about 
closed distribution systems and other collusive or restrictive market practices/structure in Japan. Trade wars obviously 
concern business firms in two or more countries as international commerce is the trans-boundary exchange of goods 
and services amongst individual companies. Business competition on international markets may certainly sometimes 
have warlike attributes in the sense that companies may use various dirty measures to promote their interests such as 
economic espionage or character assassination.  Current issues on trade tensions will be investigated. 
 
OVER VIEW OF JAPANESE ECONOMY 
 
Japans industrialized, free market economy is the second-largest in the world. Its economy is highly efficient 
and competitive in areas linked to international trade, but productivity is far lower in areas such as agriculture, 
distribution, and services. After achieving one of the highest economic growth rates in the world from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, the Japanese economy slowed dramatically in the early 1990s, when the “bubble economy” 
collapsed. Japan’s reservoir of industrial leadership and technicians, well-educated and industrial work force, high 
A 
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savings and investment rates, and intensive promotion of industrial development and foreign trade has produced a 
mature industrial economy. Japan has few natural resources, and trade helps it earn the foreign exchange needed to 
purchase raw materials for its economy. While Japan’s long-term economic prospects are considered good, Japan is 
currently in its worst period of economic growth since World War II. Plummeting stock and real estate prices in the 
early 1990s marked the end of the “bubble Economy.” The impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 also was 
substantial. Real GDP in Japan grew at an average of roughly 1% yearly in the 1990’s compared to growth in the 
1980s of about 4% per year. Real growth in 2003 was 2.7%. 
 
U.S. JAPAN RELATIONS 
 
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional 
stability and prosperity. Despite the changes in the post-Cold War strategic landscape, the U.S.-Japan alliance 
continues to be based on shared vital interests and values.  These include stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the 
preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support for human rights and democratic institutions, 
and securing of prosperity for the people of both countries and international community as well. Japan provides bases 
and financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the 
region. The U.S. currently maintains approximately 53,000 troops in Japan, about half of whom are stationed in 
Okinawa. Over the past several years the alliance has been strengthened through revised Defense Guidelines, which 
expand Japan’s non-combat role in the regional contingency. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Japan has 
participated significantly with the global war on terrorism by providing major logistical support for U.S. and coalition 
forces in the Indian Ocean. By April 2004, nearly 1,000 Self defense Force troops were operating in the southern Iraqi 
city of Al Samawah. 
 
JAPAN-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS 
 
Trade relations between Japan and the U.S. have improved over the past three years as result of the 
significant decrease in the U.S.’ trade with Japan, which was partly a result of the growth of U.S. exports to Japan, and 
partly due to the settlement of individual trade disputes in the areas of automotive and auto parts, semiconductor 
products and insurance services. Concern has been voiced by the U.S. about recent increase in Japan’s trade surplus 
with the U.S., which has been recorded since last October, due to the steadily growing U.S. economy and 
the depreciation of the Yen.. In view of the importance of the trade balance on a global basis, the Government of 
Japan is committed to promoting further structural reform including deregulation, with a view of achieving economic 
growth led by domestic demand. 
 
THE NATURE OF U.S.-JAPAN TRADE TENSIONS 
 
We are in a time of renewed between the U.S. and Japan. There have been very sharp and very public 
criticisms of Japan by top U.S. officials in recent weeks and months; Robert Rubin and Larry summers from the 
Treasury Department, Commerce Secretary Daley, and U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky have all been heard 
from. The refrains are familiar ones: Japan needs to open up and deregulate its economy so that it imports more and is 
as dependent for growth. Although the themes are the same, it is important to recognize that the contest is now very 
different. In the past, tensions were caused by U.S. fears of Japanese strength; now, however, they are due to U.S. 
fears of Japanese weakness. Formerly, it was thought that Japan’s protected home market and relentless export drive 
posed a predatory threat to the rest of the world.  From the Japanese viewpoint, competition policy is becoming even 
more important for Japan as its government proceeds with deregulation.  In relation to the way of handing disputes on 
restrictive practices will considerably impact the future development of the Japanese competition policy. In short, such 
disputes should be handled in such way as to help strengthen that policy. The analysis here is placed on the context of 
Japan-U.S. trade relations. But considering the factors described above. If Japan and the U.S. could construct a better 
way to deal with disputes over restrictive practices, it would benefit other countries that may have similar disputes. It 
may also suggest alternative international efforts to develop more effective rules related to trade and competition. 
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NO GOOD REASONS FOR TRADE DISPUTES 
 
Many economists believe that there is no good reason for this trade dispute. They make three arguments. 
First, they argue that, given the normal factors that affect trade between nations, the U.S. would be expected to have a 
trade deficit with Japan. Second, they argue that the large rise in the trade deficit in the 1980s was the result of 
unusual macroeconomic events-event that is not likely to be repeated. And third, they argue that the Japanese markets 
are as open as are American markets. American companies could sell  in Japan if they made better products and made 
a more intensive effort to penetrate the Japanese market. In this argument, Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S. reflects 
its comparative advantage. The large increase in the American trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s is the result of the 
macroeconomic factors. These factors include (1) high savings, (2) high interest rates in the U.S., (3) appreciation of 
U.S. dollar, (4) that the fact that since 1983 the American economy has been growing faster than the Japanese 
economy. Finally, these economists argue that the Japanese market is relatively open. They argue that tariff rates are 
similar to those found in the U.S..; both are quite low. Quotas in Japan exist only for leather and coal briquettes. 
Export subsidies no longer exist. Non-tariff barriers protect a similar portion of the market in Japan as in the U.S.. In 
contrast, many other economists, political scientists, journalists, and politicians believed that there is good justification 
for the American dispute with Japan. Japan needs to make some changes before the two countries can trade fairly. 
Trade issues have become so polarized that objective facts and indicators become scarce. The Japanese see Americans 
as trying to compensate for their lack of competitiveness. American negotiators portray the Japanese behavior as a 
question of fairness, and justify their threats by claiming a history of broken promises. . Although most Japanese 
individually still have warm feelings towards Americans, they are increasingly impatient with U.S. government 
attitudes. The “Japan-bashing and political hammering of Japanese cars and electronics by American politicians have 
been matched by an anti-American movement in Japan. 
 
U.S. TRADING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
 
The U.S. believes in a system of open trade subject to the rule of law. Since World War II, American 
presidents have argued that engagement in world trade offers American producers access to large foreign markets and 
givers consumers a wider choice of products to buy. More recently, American’s leaders have noted that competition 
from foreign producers also helps keep prices down for numerous goods, thereby reducing pressures from inflation. 
Americans contend that free trade benefits other nations as well. Economists have long argued that trade allows 
nations to concentrate on producing the goods and services they can make most efficiently-thereby increasing the 
overall productive capacity of the entire community of nations. What’s more, Americans are convinced that trade 
promotes economic growth, social stability, and democracy in individual countries and that it advances world 
prosperity, the rule of law, and peach in international relations. An open trading system requires that countries allow 
fair and nondiscriminatory access to each other’s markets. To that end, the U.S. is willing to grant countries favorable 
access to its markets if they reciprocate by reducing their own trade barriers, either as part of multilateral or bilateral 
agreements. Are we implementing these principles and practices? Countries believe the U.S. is still values these 
principles and practices? 
 
KEY PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT U.S. TRADING POLICY 
 
Because of the U.S. government’s urgency to improve the trade deficit, its policy toward Japan has not 
addressed the relationship in its wider context. Through the strategy of aggressive unilateralism, the U. S. has 
generated are friction than justified by this unilateral posture. Overall trade policy has been disjointed, alternating its 
focus from trade to security issues. The U.S. has demanded change in trade relations while upholding the current 
security relationship. Critics of U.S. policy argue that U.S. aggressive unilateralism and managed trade violate the 
principles of the multilateral free trade system. The U.S. has been weak in its public-relations effort to gain support for 
its trade policy. Pressure is growing to reduce U.S. troops stationed in Japan. Persistent U.S. trade deficits with Japan 
frustrate U.S. politicians and business leaders. Since Japan had already eliminated most tariffs and quotas by the mid-
1980s, U.S. policy under the Bush administration shifted to demand structural reforms of the Japanese economy. The 
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty traditionally offset trade controversies and stabilized the relationship. 
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PERIODIC STRAINS IN RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 
 
Relations periodically have been strained by differences over trade and economy issues, and less often, over 
divergent foreign policy stances. Strains arising from trade issues peaked about 1995, as Japan’s unprecedented slow 
growth contrasted with the U.S. economy’s steady expansion and rising international competitiveness, and, for a time, 
the widely watched U.S. trade deficit with Japan began to decline substantially. The end of the Cold War and collapse 
of the Soviet Union called into question some of the strategic underpinnings of the alliance within both the American 
and Japanese publics. After a period of strategic uncertainty in both countries over how to respond to the post Cold 
War situation in East Asia, leaders on both sides saw their interests as best served by strengthening the U.S.-Japan 
alliance to support respective strategic interests in the region. The U.S. and Japan share the same broad objectives 
regarding the unstable Korean Peninsula, but Japanese officials frequently have expressed a feeling of being left out of 
U.S. decision making.  
 
ECONOMIC ISSUES AND TRADE 
 
Japan’s economy has been anemic at best, and at times in decline, for most of the 10 years. Economists and 
policymakers in Japan and in the U.S. have attributed Japan’s difficulties to a number of factors. One has been the 
effects since the beginning of the 1990s of the burst of the economic “bubble,” which saw the value of land and other 
assets collapse. Furthermore, some analysts point to Japanese fiscal policies that have emphasized budgetary restraint 
and increased taxes that have also kept a lid on demand. In the long term, Japanese and U.S. economists point to rigid 
government regulations that stifle productivity in a number of sectors. The U.S. and others have been pressuring Japan 
to undertake deregulation. The U.S. and Japan are closely tied economically. Japan ranks third to Canada and Mexico 
as the largest U.S. export market. The U.S. ranks as Japan’s number one export market and import supplier. Besides 
the growing imbalance in bilateral trade, the U.S. and Japan confront a range of issues, any or all of which could lead 
to sharpened tensions.  In May 2005 the U.S. had a total merchandise trade deficit of $710 billion, while Japan and 
Germany scored a cumulative trade surplus of $324 billion ($125+$199 billion). The average American citizen owes 
$6,551 in federal debt to foreign interests, because of our nation’s excessive federal spending and our consuming more 
from the rest of the world than we produce. A family of 4 owes more than $26,206 in this regard, of which 38% is 
owed to Japanese investors. The U.S. has experienced trade deficits with Japan; these became especially large in the 
1980s. They also did not fall as much as expected after the dollar started depreciating. Also, Japanese practices are 
threatening certain strategic American industries; this could have serious long-term effects on American life. The 
trade deficits have had an effect on jobs in America. They may also have cost American some of its manufacturing 
capacity, which threatens its leadership in technological innovation. The Japanese see their market as open. They 
believe that they are doing everything possible to remedy the American grievances. They believe that Americans are 
blaming them for problems caused by Americans. 
 
AREAS OF DISPUTES AND TENSIONS 
 
We are in a time of renewed tensions between the U.S. and Japan. There have been very sharp and very 
public criticisms of Japan in the following areas: 
 
 Debates on U.S. beef products.  
 Japan needs to open up and deregulate its economy so that it imports more and is less dependent on exports 
for growth. 
 Japan’s protected home market and relentless export drive posed a predatory threat to the rest of the world. 
 Japan systematically discriminates against foreign market entrants. 
 Import restrictions, export control, and currency manipulations by Japanese government. 
 Its failure to stimulate domestic economic growth. 
 Disputes on U.S. agricultural products. 
 Japanese market needs to be more open to manufactured exports from developing countries in order to 
sustain their growth. 
 Japan has a responsibility to help promote global growth. 
 Japanese government intervention and control in the services sector. 
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 Binding of all the major elements of the bilateral measures previously agreed with the U.S. on insurance, 
banking and other financial services. 
 Protective policies remain in some professional services. 
 There have been no major changes in Japan’s tariff structure. 
 Port and customs procedures for imports remain lengthy by developed-country standards. 
 Too many technical barriers in Japan with little information on the total number of such regulations are 
available. 
 Japan’s import and investment promotion programs include substantial government incentives, yet it is not 
evident that these programs fully address the obstacles encountered. 
 Japan’s implementation of tariff requirements under the WTO resulted in a significant increase in the number 
of specific rates. Japan has triggered Special Safe Guard under the WTO Agreement for a number of 
products subject to tariff. 
 Structural problems with Japanese markets. 
 Rule-based policies by Japanese government. 
 Implementation of “liberalization countermeasures” by Japanese government. 
 The main protection of the Japanese market now comes from non-tariff barriers. Japanese government should 
reduce non-tariff barriers to improve trade relations. 
 Japanese market is still closed against U.S. companies. 
 Critics of U.S. policy argue that U.S. aggressive unilateralism and managed trade violate the principles of 
multilateral free trade system. The U.S. has been weak in its public-relations effort to gain support for its 
trade policy. The U.S. government should encourage more bilateral and multilateral trade relations. 
 
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS 
 
 Emphasize alliance cooperation. 
 Emphasize U.S. Trade and Economic Objectives. 
 “Bypass” all negotiations with Japan. 
 Emphasis on multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, including establishing a bilateral process of dispute 
resolution. 
 More comprehensive and cooperative arrangement for trade and investment between the two countries. 
 Less Japanese government control and intervention I markets and more transparency in the administrative 
process. 
 The U.S. trade policy should combine low-key bilateral negotiations and WTO dispute settlement for more 
controversial issues. 
 The U.S. should be flexible regarding possible reduction of troops stationed in Japan. 
 Opportunities should be taken for deepening U.S. engagement in East Asia through cooperation with Japan 
inn regional security forums and efforts to increase trust and support for arms control. 
 Structural reforms of the U.S. and Japanese economies should be discussed in the context of bilateral 
negotiations. 
 Concessions by the U.S. on issues of concern to Japan will help to build a pattern of reciprocity. 
 The U.S. should cooperate with Japan on global concerns with Japan. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
American trade negotiators have been chipping away at Japanese trade and investment barriers for the past 
thirty-five years. At times, as in 1993-95, the bargaining process has been very public and tense. Gradually, official 
barriers to both trade and investment have fallen, and negotiators have worked out many agreements on other policies, 
including procedures on government procurement, standards, testing, customs, and others. But success is incomplete. 
Japan in the late 1990s still seems to be a less hospitable environment for foreign corporations than other industrial or 
even some developing countries. Of course there will continue to be trade conflicts between the U.S. and Japan. That 
is inevitable given the commercial stakes, and given continuing U.S. perceptions of Japan as an unfairly closed 
market. And of course, Japan does have its share of real trade barriers. The difference now, though, is that these 
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conflicts no longer undermine U.S. confidence in the liberal trading order. In that sense at least, the U.S. –Japan 
trading relationship has become normalized. A the end,  the United Sates and Japan will be good trading partners in 
many years ahead even though we are expecting some level of  trade tensions and disputes. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. CRS Report: IB97004 – Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress for Congress – NLE.  
2. http//www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/nubs/zart/ch8htm.  
3. http//www.Brookings.org/dybodocroft/fp/cnaps/papers/1999.  
4. Bregeon & Luchare, 1988.  
5. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Japan, August 2005.  
6. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews: First Press Release, Secretariat and Government 
Summaries, January 1998.  
7. Brink Lindsey, The Changing Nature of U.S.-Japan Trade Tensions, April 6. 1998).  
8. http//www.freetrade.org./pubs/tna-002 html.  
9. Tom Barry and Martha Honney, Japan: Trade and Security Interdependence, Volume 2, Number 18, January 
1997.  
10. MW Hodges, Grandfather foreign Trade & Debt Report-Summary Page.  
11. Crisina Davis, Japan: Trade and Security Interdependence, Vol. 2, Number 18, 1997. 
12. Rethinking the Context of U.S. –Japan Relations: the Cold War. 
